Hominids started using primitive stone tools millions of years ago.
The orthodox view explains the war's one-sidedness in terms of the Coalition's strengths, especially its advanced technology, which is often held to have destroyed the Iraqis' equipment or broken their will without exposing Coalition forces to extensive close combat on the ground. To account for what is now known, and in particular, for new details on the conduct of the ground campaign, I propose a new explanation based partly on a combination of pieces taken from both camps' arguments - but mostly on a different conception of how technology and skill affected the outcome.
That is, I argue that a synergistic interaction between a major skill imbalance and new technology caused the radical outcome of In the Gulf War, Iraqi errors created opportunities for new Coalition technology to perform at proving-ground effectiveness levels and sweep actively resisting Iraqi Republican Guard units from the battlefield.
Without the Iraqis' mistakes to provide openings, however, the outcome would have been far different in spite of the Coalition's technology, and Coalition casualties would likely have reached or exceeded prewar expectations.
But without the new weapons, mistakes like the Iraqis' would not have enabled the Coalition to prevail with the historically low losses of the Gulf War.
Many previous armies have displayed combat skills no better than Iraq's, but without producing results anything like those of ; only a powerful interaction between skill imbalance and new technology can explain the difference. This new explanation has important policy implications for net assessment, force planning, and the defense budget.
Most current net assessment and force planning methodologies focus on the numbers and technical characteristics of the two sides' weapons.
Similarly, arguments that modernization spending should be protected at the expense of training and readiness accounts overestimate the military value of technology per se, and underestimate the role of skill in determining the effects that any given technology will produce.
More broadly, this new explanation also challenges perhaps the most sweeping legacy of the war: To make this case, I first specify the outcome to be explained. I next describe the new information sources on which my analysis of this outcome is based. I then outline briefly the main events of the war, with particular emphasis on the ground campaign, and on a case study of a particular ground engagement the "Battle of 73 Easting".
From this, I identify a number of important discrepancies between the record of the ground fighting and the implications of the main current explanations of the war's outcome.
I then develop my alternative theory, and show how it provides a more satisfactory explanation of what we now know of the war's conduct.
Finally, I discuss the implications of that alternative for policy and for scholarship in international security affairs. The War's Military Outcome and its Legacy While the Gulf War's disappointing political outcome has received much recent attention, my focus is on its military results, and in particular, the Coalition's ability to prevail with a historically low loss rate.
In less than six weeks,Coalition troops destroyed a defending Iraqi army of hundreds of thousands, losing only attackers. Marines' in the invasion of Tarawa in These efforts attracted many of the country's foremost scholars and policy analysts, and exploited the best available net assessment methods.
The results were way off. All published results radically overestimated casualties: The majority were off by more than an order of magnitude; official estimates were reportedly high by at least that much, while some official projections were reportedly off by more than a factor of It has made the Gulf War a shaping event for defense planning in the s in much the same way as the painful defeat in Vietnam came to shape U.
New doctrines, weapons, and organizations are assessed in simulations of updated Gulf Wars. Acceptable casualty levels are judged against a benchmark.
This sweeping policy legacy is a direct consequence of the extreme nature of the war's military outcome, and especially of the radically low Coalition loss rate. The reasons for this outcome are thus an important question for scholarship, and are my focus here.WOA!
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Our approach is as unique as it is dynamic. We propose a panel data estimation strategy for quantifying the effects of the container revolution on international trade.
• We exploit time and cross sectional variation in countries’ first adoption of container facilities and product level variation in container usage.
The advancement of new technology has been taking place since the beginning of human history. From the invention of items like the spear and knifes made out of rocks and sticks to aid in the.
Technology Advancement in developing countries during Digital Age Muhammed Miah1*, Adnan Omar2 What many fail to realize is that as our world is becoming smaller via technology, it is important to understand the role of technological advances in developing nations and.